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Abstract
An agrowth strategy, defined as being agnostic and indifferent about 
GDP growth, is proposed as an alternative to unconditional anti- and 
pro-growth strategies. It is argued that such a strategy can contribute to 
reducing scientific and political polarization in the long-standing debate 
on growth versus the environment. Hence, it can broaden urgently needed 
support for serious sustainability and climate policies. The exposition 
includes a novel graphical illustration, a summary of recent surveys of 
citizens and scientists regarding support for an agrowth position, and a 
discussion of implications for population growth and policies.
1. I am grateful to the editor, David Samways, for careful reading and insightful comments.
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1. Growth fixation as a barrier to sustainability policies
Humanity faces serious sustainability challenges but has been incapable so far 
of implementing sufficiently strict policies that guarantee a sustainable course 
of the economy. One important reason is that voters and politicians – fueled 
by pessimistic environmental science studies – fear that serious policies will 
hamper economic growth. Whether this will be the case or not is of no relevance. 
What matters is the psychology behind it. If people cannot be convinced that 
policies will not harm growth then such policies will not receive majority support. 
Of course, one could respond by claiming that green growth is possible, even 
though the evidence for this is weak. In fact, the uncertainty surrounding this issue 
is immense and it is impossible to provide definite proof of whether or not green 
growth is feasible. What we know for sure is that current growth is not sustainable 
and that for a while, during a transition phase, it will remain unsustainable. One 
way out of this dilemma is to refrain from trying to convince voters and politicians 
that green growth is possible. In fact, economists have been unsuccessful in 
persuading both groups, otherwise good sustainability policies would have 
already been implemented. I will propose here that we should become agnostic 
and indifferent about GDP growth, i.e. adopt an agrowth position (van den Bergh, 
2011). One reason is that the GDP is not a good indicator of happiness or social 
welfare. Another reason applies specifically to rich countries where for some time 
increases in average income growth have not contributed to significant increases 
in social welfare.
Climate change illustrates the need for an ideological shift to agrowth (van den 
Bergh, 2017a). The challenges posed by climate change and policies to tackle 
it have revived the growth debate. Modern economies and lifestyles are highly 
dependent on burning fossil fuels, generating CO2 emissions responsible for 
global warming. If per capita GDP increases by 1.5% annually, to realize the 2°C 
goal (supported by IPCC and the Paris Climate Agreement), carbon intensity or 
emissions per unit of GDP should decrease by some 80% by 2050, which comes 
down to a 4.4% average annual improvement (Antal and van den Bergh, 2016). 
Even if economic growth would come to a halt – i.e. in the case of zero growth 
– still an impressive 67% intensity reduction, or 2.9% on average per year, will 
be required. Since these reduction rates should be net of all energy rebound 
(Sorrell, 2007) and carbon leakage effects (Felder and Rutherford, 1993), they are 
merely lower bounds. Under serious climate policy the rate of economic growth 
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is thus likely to drop for some time, possibly until we have reached a zero-carbon 
economy. Such a consequence will induce fear for and opposition to associated 
climate policies in many advocates of green growth. An agrowth strategy, on the 
other hand, will facilitate the acceptance of these policies as it will free us from the 
unnecessary, welfare-obstructing growth paradigm. This will result in removing 
false trade-offs between GDP growth and other goals arising from the constraint 
of always, at any time and under any conditions, having to achieve GDP growth.
2. We should abandon GDP but are unable
A large majority of economists, journalists and politicians, irrespective of their 
political affiliation, express themselves uncritically about GDP and fail to distinguish 
it clearly from (social) welfare. Nevertheless, a growing group of economists, 
including many Nobel laureates, have explicitly accepted the shortcomings of 
GDP (summarized in Table 1). Early critics included eminent economists such as 
Kuznets (1941), Galbraith (1958) and Samuelson (1961). Later influential voices 
are Mishan (1967), Nordhaus and Tobin (1972), Hueting (1974), Hirsch (1976), Sen 
(1976), Scitovsky (1976), Daly (1977), Tinbergen and Hueting (1992), and Arrow et 
al. (1995); more recent contributions come from Frank (2004), Kahneman et al. 
(2004), Victor (2008) and Jackson (2009). 
In line with this, empirical research on happiness suggests that in most Western 
(OECD) countries the increase in prosperity or happiness stagnated somewhere 
in the period between 1950 and 1970 or even reversed to negative trend, despite 
the steady growth in GDP per capita (Layard, 2005). This is supported by empirical 
studies of alternative indicators of social welfare, such as the ISEW (Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare) (Daly and Cobb, 1989). Moreover, psychological 
research has found that individuals quickly become accustomed or adapt to new 
conditions, including income increases, and as a result welfare increases fall short 
of ex ante expectations (Easterlin, 1974).
Unfortunately, the majority of economists are less critical and accept or even 
overtly support the false idea that that GDP growth always means progress. 
They should realize that both microeconomic and macroeconomic theories tend 
to formulate societal goals in terms of social welfare not GDP or its change. In 
the standard utility-maximizing behavioral model of microeconomics, income 
co-determines, with prices, the budget constraint, rather than being a proxy for 
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utility. Likewise, in macroeconomics, growth theory is dominated by models of 
optimal economic growth in which the guiding criterion is (intertemporal) social 
welfare rather than an aggregate GDP type of income measure.
Table 1. Main shortcomings of GDP as a proxy of social welfare
General Specific
GDP use does not satisfy – GDP does not distinguish clearly between costs
basic principles of good   and benefits.
bookkeeping. – It does not correct for changes in (economic and
  environment) stocks.
 – It does not account for external (or social=private+
  external) costs. 
 –  It is an estimate of the costs rather than benefits of 
market activities in a country.
Using GDP (growth) as a  – Optimal growth theory employs social welfare rather 
proxy of social welfare   than GDP/income type of criteria. 
(progress) is inconsistent  – In microeconomics, income is part of the budget 
with the general welfare   constraint, not a proxy of utility. 
focus in microeconomics  – If income is not a robust measure of welfare at the 
and macroeconomics.   individual or micro-level, then aggregation of individual 
incomes into GDP cannot result in a robust indicator of 
social welfare.
GDP does not capture  – Modern income growth increases material consumption 
stylized facts of empirical   at the cost of basic needs like serenity, clean air, and 
research on subjective   direct access to nature; the latter are, however, not 
well-being (happiness).  captured by GDP.
 –  Somewhere between 1960 and the present, the 
increase in welfare stagnated or even reversed into a 
negative trend in most Western countries, despite the 
steady pace of GDP growth.
 –  Individuals may adapt or get used to changed 
circumstances, including a higher income; thus  
well-being may temporarily change in response but 
then return to its baseline level.
GDP does not capture  – GDP per capita emphasizes average income, and 
income inequality, relative   neglects the income distribution, even though this 
income, and status-seeking   affects opportunities for personal development and 
in consumption.  well-being. 
 –  GDP does not capture that individuals or families  
with low incomes benefit relatively more from an 
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income rise, because of the diminishing marginal utility 
of income.
 –  Welfare is relative or context-dependent, characterized 
by comparing oneself with others, rivalry via “positional 
or status goods”.
 –  As GDP omits relative income aspects of welfare, it 
tends to overestimate social welfare and progress.
 –  Rises in relative income and welfare come down to a 
zero-sum game: one individual loses what another one 
gains; GDP cannot account for this.
GDP neglects the informal  – In general, GDP just covers activities and transactions 
economy, its share in the   that have a market price and neglects informal 
whole economy, and   transactions between people that occur outside 
its change.  formal markets.
 –  Actual GDP growth sometimes reflects a transfer of 
existing informal activities (unpaid labor) to the formal 
market; so the benefits were already enjoyed but the 
market costs were not yet part of GDP.
 –  This holds for both developed and developing 
countries, and for such informal activities as subsistence 
agriculture, voluntary work, household work, and  
child care.
 –  The GDP can, therefore, not serve as a measure to 
judge the welfare impact of fundamental changes that 
involve a transition from informal to a formal activities.
GDP does not capture  – The presence of externalities means that market prices 
environmental externalities,   do not reflect total social (=private+ external) costs,  
damage to ecosystems, and   making them unreliable signals. GDP is, however, 
depletion of renewable   calculated using these prices. 
and non-renewable  – If air, water, or a natural area are being polluted, any 
natural resources.   damage does not enter GDP, but when pollution is 
being cleaned up this contributes to GDP.
 –  Capital depreciation associated with environmental 
changes (fish stocks, forests, biodiversity) and depletion 
of resource supplies (fossil energy, metal ores) is 
missing from the GDP calculation. As a result, GDP 
suggests we are richer than we really are.
NOTE: THIS TABLE IS REPRODUCED FROM VAN DEN BERGH (2017) AND SUMMARIZES THE SURVEY IN VAN DEN 
BERGH (2009).
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So if this is all true, why do so many influential people get nervous when there 
is little GDP growth? This paradox (van den Bergh, 2009) can be explained by all 
of us constantly receiving the message, through news media and in education, 
that economic growth is imperative. Moreover, the response to low GDP growth 
from politicians, economists, financial markets and international organizations 
like the OECD (e.g., 2011), the World Bank (e.g., 2012), and the IMF is consistently 
negative. They all signal that GDP growth is a sine qua non for our society. 
An important additional reason is the widespread belief that GDP growth is a 
necessary condition for economic stability and full employment. Empirical 
evidence for this view is weak though, indicating that the relationship between 
GDP and employment is not constant (Saget, 2000). Broadly accepted insights 
about long-run equilibrium employment suggest that it depends more on search 
time (jobs and employees); structural mismatches between education and work; 
the difference between gross and net income; and the gap between income and 
unemployment benefits (Pissarides, 2000). Moreover, the causality of growth and 
employment is easily confused as more employment can increase GDP rather 
than the reverse. In this respect, the “productivity trap”, coined by Jackson 
and Victor (2011), is relevant. It denotes that growth compensates for potential 
unemployment resulting from technological innovation driving labor productivity 
improvements. This is possible as a higher labor productivity translates into 
higher incomes, allowing for additional purchasing power to balance the larger 
production capacity associated with productivity increases. This is, in a nutshell, 
the fundamental mechanism driving economic growth. Incidentally, by shifting 
taxes from income to environmental externalities one could redirect technological 
change from improving the productivity of labor to that of energy and material 
inputs to production. As a result, it would be easier to realize full employment and 
environmental goals simultaneously.
3. Agrowth elaborated
An agrowth position or strategy comes down to being agnostic about, i.e. 
ignoring, the GDP (per capita) indicator in public debates and policymaking. 
It means we will be indifferent, neutral or “agnostic” about the desirability of 
GDP growth, an idea first proposed in van den Bergh (2011). The motivation 
is the insight that unconditional growth implies an unnecessary and avoidable 
constraint on the search for human welfare and progress. By definition, such a 
constraint hampers the achievement of good public policies and decisions in any 
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area, whether social, health, labor, equity, education, environment or climate. This 
is graphically illustrated by Figure 1 in van den Bergh (2017a). One should note 
that an agrowth position opposes unconditional GDP growth, also known as the 
growth paradigm, but not growth per se.
Under an agrowth strategy, periods of high, low, zero and even negative growth 
could alternate with one another, as long as environmentally sustainability and 
progress in terms of welfare were guaranteed. We would no longer give priority 
to average income over welfare, or assume growth would be necessary or sufficient 
for progress. While progress might sometimes coincide with growth, nobody 
would really care. With regard to environmental pressures, an agrowth strategy 
would allow for selective decline and selective growth of distinct economic 
and industrial sectors which would not necessarily translate into aggregate 
GDP growth.
By ignoring GDP information, we would in some periods be capable to give up 
potential GDP growth for a better environment, less unemployment, more income 
equality, more leisure or better health care. As a result, welfare-enhancing policy 
would be given priority over GDP growth-enhancing policy. This would contribute 
to social-political acceptability of public policies focusing on solving urgent and 
socially important problems that are likely to reduce social welfare. Such an 
approach is consistent with the advice by Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman et al. 
(2004) to focus the attention of public policy on minimizing unhappiness. Clear 
examples are avoiding dangerous climate change, minimizing structurally high 
unemployment, and reducing extreme inequality and poverty. Whether these 
policies would work out well in terms of growth of GDP (per capita) would no 
longer be an issue.
Another advantage of an agrowth strategy is that it increases economic stability 
and reduces the likelihood of economic crises. The reason is that it weakens 
positive feedback in the economy which contributes to business cycles and crises. 
As argued in Antal and van den Bergh (2013), the current economic system is self-
amplifying because a majority of the connections between important economic 
system variables take the form of positive feedbacks, while a minority of such 
connections takes the form of negative feedbacks. A positive feedback denotes 
that an output of a system enters the same system as an input, which then reinforces 
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the actual trend in the output. This is irrespective of whether the trend is a decline 
or a growth pattern. In other words, positive feedback can generate negative 
and positive spirals. Expectation about, and predictions of, GDP growth can be 
characterized as being pro-cyclical, in the sense that if it is widely believed that 
such information has a significant influence on reality, then, through pessimistic 
(or optimistic) reactions to negative (positive) growth expectations, these beliefs 
become self-fulfilling. This sets in motion positive feedback affecting, among 
others, consumer expenditures and savings, firm expenditures and investments, 
which result in economic instability.
Positive feedback assures that, as long as we are on the upward trend, there is 
optimism about the economy. If, though, growth weakens and expectations are 
not met, pessimism about future GDP growth starts to set in, potentially leading 
to a recession. Two common solutions are offered by Keynesian and monetarist 
or new classical2 schools of macroeconomics. The first recommends stimulating 
aggregate demand by increasing public spending or lowering taxes. The second 
proposes austerity and debt reduction to restore confidence. These strategies, 
although polar opposites, share the goal of restoring the upward economic 
spiral driven by positive feedback. And in environmental terms, both put 
their full confidence in green growth. Instead, an agrowth strategy tackles a 
fundamental positive feedback mechanism underlying economic instability, 
namely the role of GDP information. By suggesting to ignore the GDP indicator, 
it weakens positive feedback in the economy, resulting in a more stable economy. 
This will discourage extremely high growth rates but also lower the probability 
of recessions. 
Antal and van den Bergh (2013) discuss a long list of options to weaken other 
positive feedbacks and strengthen or create negative feedbacks, with the aim 
to improve economic stability. One recommendation is to replace the GDP by 
another indicator, such as the Human Development Index, an income inequality 
measure (Gini index or median income), or an ISEW-type of proxy of social welfare 
(Daly and Cobb, 1989). Another idea is to construct an index that is an average of 
a minimum, medium and mean income, as it results in a monetary indicator that 
captures income inequality well (van den Bergh, 2017a).
2. Aimed at establishing neoclassical microeconomic foundations for macroeconomic analysis.
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Empirical evidence suggests that agrowth may count on reasonable support, 
which means it could depolarize the debate on growth-versus-environment. 
Figure 1 depicts results from two questionnaire surveys, among scientists and 
citizens. While green growth is the most popular position, scientists express 
relatively more support for agrowth and less for green growth than citizens. With 
more discussion of a recent and new idea like agrowth one might expect support 
for it to increase.
Figure 1. Scientists’ versus citizens’ preferences for a public policy strategy 
regarding growth and the environment
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SOURCE: VAN DEN BERGH AND DREWS (2019). DATA FROM DREWS AND VAN DEN BERGH (2016 AND 2017).
4. Riskiness of pro- and anti-growth strategies
The historical debate on growth versus the environment is often summarized 
as between optimists believing in limitless growth and pessimists seeing 
environmental and natural resource limits to growth. This opposition best defines 
the main policies and strategies found: namely, striving for green growth by 
decoupling income and production from environmental pressure versus an anti-
growth approach taking the form of stopping growth (zero-growth) for the sake 
of the environment. However, a more subtle classification of viewpoints in the 
growth debate is possible, such as the five perspectives identified by van den 
Bergh and de Mooij (1999): a moralist, denying the relevance of further growth 
for individual and social welfare, notably in rich countries; a pessimist, stressing 
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environmental and resource limits to growth; a technocrat, seeing markets and 
technological progress as powerful mechanisms to relieve any existing limits; a 
sceptic, assessing economic growth and environmental ruin as both unavoidable; 
and an optimist, considering growth as a requirement for solving environmental 
problems since it makes citizens more concerned about the environment. 
Even though many economists and international organizations express a strong 
belief in green growth, few politicians demonstrate that they share this belief 
through their actual decisions. Instead, they signal fear that serious climate policies 
will reduce the rate of economic growth. This suggests that economists have not 
provided sufficiently convincing evidence for the feasibility of green growth. This is 
no surprise, as the future is uncertain, and we have not yet succeeded in applying 
all the policy conditions that guarantee a sustainable economy, hence we do not 
know if such an economy could steadily grow in GDP terms. Theory says both 
outcomes are possible (Acemoglu et al., 2012). If green growth is not feasible, 
however, any strong messages about its realization will create false hopes. As a 
result, one will harm either the environment or economic stability.
Recently, a particular expression of anti-growth has appeared: so-called 
“degrowth” has the explicit aim of downscaling the economy to meet 
environmental goals (Schneider et al., 2010; Kallis, 2011). It can be interpreted 
as complicating climate policy with a quest for radical change. Degrowth is 
unlikely to be an effective strategy for creating broad political support given that 
it focuses on variables with an indirect link to emissions, instead of on the carbon 
content of growth, in addition to its basic message that we need income and 
other sacrifices to save the environment (Drews and Antal, 2016). Furthermore, as 
degrowth does not follow a clear welfare approach and is not focused on sharply 
distinguishing between low-carbon and high-carbon consumption, it runs the risk 
of destroying too much welfare for the purpose of sustainability, without even 
guaranteeing an effective, let alone a cost-effective, way of solving sustainability 
problems. For instance, the degrowth proposal does not offer a clear framework 
for satisfactorily balancing – from a welfare perspective – changes in inputs 
(e.g., fuels), energy efficiency of technologies, composition of production and 
consumption, and volume or scale of activities. Any physical or GDP degrowth 
goal will then be arbitrary and debatable. Another shortcoming is that the term 
“degrowth” is defined and used differently by distinct authors. One can identify 
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at least five interpretations (van den Bergh, 2011), namely as GDP decline, less 
consumption (unclear how measured), a work-time reduction, a smaller physical 
size of the economy, and a radical move away from “capitalism” and markets. 
Such ambiguity does not contribute to productive societal or scientific exchange. 
The proposal for degrowth is likely to contribute to polarization, creating sharp 
differences between supporters and opponents of degrowth. If we sell climate 
solutions as degrowth, then support for these is likely to diminish rather than rise 
over time.
Instead, an agrowth strategy can, because of its neutrality and indifference 
regarding GDP growth, bridge pro-growth and anti-growth views and so reduce 
polarization. In fact, I have many personal experiences with degrowth and green 
growth believers expressing support for the agrowth position. To see why it can 
bridge the divide, one should recognize that agrowth does not preclude GDP 
growth when it is feasible and improves human welfare, and neither rejects GDP 
decline when an outcome of good social or environmental policies. In view of 
this, an agrowth strategy has the potential to create and amplify the political 
space for balancing distinct components of social welfare, such as consumption, 
employment, environment, leisure, health, and inequality. In particular, agrowth 
will make it easier to sell serious climate policy to the public and politicians, 
much easier than selling degrowth. In addition, by tempering preoccupation 
with continued GDP growth, it will moderate panic that is common among 
economists, journalists and politicians when GDP growth slows down. In other 
words, an agrowth strategy contributes to economic stability.
Figures 2 and 3 graphically illustrate that an agrowth strategy, i.e. indifference 
about where on the horizontal axis (indicating the rate of GDP growth) the 
economy is positioned, is robust against uncertainty about the relationship (curve 
1 versus 2) between the GDP growth rate (horizontal axis) and the change in 
other components of human welfare including environmental sustainability (ES) 
(vertical axis). It is assumed here that environmentally desirable outcomes require 
being positioned above the horizontal 0 (zero) line, meaning that no reductions 
in environmental performance are accepted. Hence, a degrowth strategy strives 
to be in (rectangular) area A, a zero-growth strategy on the top (positive) part of 
vertical line h, a low growth strategy in (rectangular) area B, and a high-growth 
strategy in (rectangular) area C (where growth is higher than rate g, such as the 
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often expressed desire of at least 2% growth). However, an agrowth strategy does 
not exclude any of these areas.
Now, a pessimistic perspective on the growth-vs-environment relationship is 
shown in Figure 2 through a downward-sloped curve 1 that represents the upper 
bound to feasible combinations of changes in GDP and ES, while Figure 3 displays 
an optimistic perspective through an upward-sloped curve 2. Consider first Figure 
2, where a green growth strategy aiming for growth beyond the rate g is not wise 
as it will not achieve its aim of ending up in area C. The reason is illustrated by 
the red position above the constraint 1 which represents an infeasible goal. If one 
strives for high growth associated with it, the economy will end up in the blue 
point below the constraint (following the arrow). In this case degrowth (area A) 
and low growth (area B) strategies are feasible. On the other hand, in the case 
depicted in Figure 3, a high growth strategy is feasible but a degrowth strategy 
not because while environmental impacts get lower, it becomes increasing 
difficult to sustain human welfare. Indeed, trying to be in area A fails here as 
one will be forced to be below constraint 2, indicated by an arrow from the red 
goal to the blue realization. Hence, unlike an agrowth strategy that is tolerant 
to any outcome (positive, zero or negative GDP growth, or areas A, B and C), 
neither growth and degrowth strategies are robust or precautionary in the face of 
uncertainty about the conflict between growth and environmental sustainability 
(represented by uncertainty about whether curve 1 or 2 holds true). For further 
discussion, see van den Bergh (2017a).
In conclusion, both green growth and degrowth lack credible empirical support 
and make debatable assumptions. These limitations make either of them risky 
strategies in solving environmental and climate change problems, as well as 
more generally in realizing progress in terms of social welfare. We do not need to 
assume that growth and environment are conflictive or compatible. Recognizing 
uncertainty about the future and complexity of the economy warrants being 
precautionary – making an agrowth strategy the better response.
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Figure 2. Growth strategy fails in case of conflict between growth and 
environmental sustainability, while degrowth and agrowth strategies remain 
within feasibility area indicated by area below brown curve 1.
Note: Search space for human progress spanned by relative changes in GDP & ES in 
interval [t, t+1]; bold letters denote the rectangles separated by the vertical and horizontal 
broken lines.
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Figure 3. Degrowth strategy fails in case of no conflict between growth and 
environmental sustainability, while agrowth and growth strategies remain 
within feasibility area indicated by area below green curve 2.
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5. Climate change and population growth
Climate change is also affected by population growth, while income GDP growth 
affects both of them in different directions with an uncertain net outcome, 
depending on the country and other factors. On the one hand, before we have 
made a transition to low-carbon technologies, economic growth will increase 
emissions directly. On the other hand, increasing income goes along with a 
demographic transition in certain parts of the developing world, leading birth 
rates to go down due to, among other factors, a fall in infant mortality leading 
parents to recognise that fewer births will meet their needs in old age, urbanization, 
improved education of women and access to contraception (Chesnais, 1992). An 
agrowth position does not deny the need for economic growth so a scenario 
where growth contributes to demographic transitions in some countries (notably 
in sub-Saharan Africa) may be an outcome. In rich countries with low or no 
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population growth, however, low economic growth is more likely as a transition 
scenario before a low-carbon economy is achieved. For some middle-income 
countries with high birth rates the trade-off is less clear beforehand and the net 
effect of economic growth on emissions, taking population effects into account, 
may be either positive or negative. An agrowth strategy is consistent with such 
a diversity of growth strategies in different countries, notably poor and rich 
ones, unlike a green growth position which requires high growth in all countries, 
denying national diversity of potential and need for growth. Note that agrowth 
as a strategy does not apply to population directly. Instead, population growth 
worldwide needs to be stopped as soon as possible to avoid further overshooting 
of the human economy, including with regard to global warming. 
A recent account of the link between climate and population and adequate 
policies is provided by Bongaarts and O’Neill (2018). They argue against various 
misperceptions, such as that population growth is under control and does not 
matter much for climate change, and that population policies are ineffective and 
too controversial to succeed. Possibly, the worst decision one can make in terms 
of climate-change externalities is not to buy a product or service but to have 
a child (Harford, 1998; Wynes and Nicholas, 2017), unless during its life-time it 
will invent some cheap zero-emission technology that will change the world. It 
implies additional emissions over the entire lifetime of a child, decades into the 
future. With a growing number of people on Earth, the carbon budget associated 
with a safe climate is quickly exhausted. In view of this, some have proposed, in 
addition to a tax on the carbon content of energy, goods and services, so-called 
birth taxes (Kennedy, 1995). One argument why the decision of having a child 
should be regulated or priced separately is that parents make this decision while 
arguably only accounting for their own welfare effects and neglecting any social 
or environmental costs generated by the child in the future. Moreover parents 
may be insufficiently rational to perceive all private costs of raising children until 
adulthood. In addition, the desired number of children will be influenced by 
the culture and religion to which parents belong. Parents will thus be unable to 
respond rationally or optimally to the sum of private and social costs (as captured 
by the carbon tax), suggesting that birth regulation is required as well to assure 
that climate goals are reached. The magnitude of this is not insignificant: Bohn 
and Stuart (2015) calculate that an optimal child tax equals 21.1% of a corrected 
per capita income during the time span of a generation. They illustrate this for the 
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USA, noting that the relevant income measure was on average ± $48,000 per adult 
per year during the study period, which translates into a child tax of about $10,000 
per year during a period of 30 years from birth on. Hence, over the 30 year period 
the undiscounted sum of annual taxes would amount to $300,000. Implementation 
of such a policy would arguably also contribute to reducing poverty in the next 
generation as a larger share of people would be the offspring of relatively rich 
families who could more easily afford a child tax (even though it would be higher 
in absolute terms), offering a better start in life in terms of wealth and education. 
Although such a child tax is sure to meet ethical and political resistance, one should 
recognize its unique capacity to simultaneously address climate, overpopulation 
and long-term poverty challenges. Moreover, the associated tax revenues could 
be used to reduce existing income taxes so as to limit the overall tax burden for 
households which might simultaneously increase employment (Freire-González, 
2018). Incidentally, an alternative for a child tax with similar consequences would 
be a system of tradable birth permits (a combination of regulation and market 
mechanism), as proposed by Boulding (1964) and elaborated by Daly (1977) and 
others (see references in De La Croix and Gosseries, 2009).
6. A transition to an agrowth paradigm
One cannot be optimistic about changing the current growth paradigm, but it is 
worth trying as the permanent focus of our society and politicians on GDP growth 
forms a barrier to urgently needed sustainability policies. The fear that stringent 
climate policies will frustrate future economic growth is an important reason for 
many voters and politicians to be reluctant to genuinely support such policies. 
This partly explains why the Copenhagen climate summit failed and the recent 
Paris agreement was designed around voluntary national climate targets rather 
than globally harmonized policies. The discussion about climate versus growth 
will probably intensify in the coming years now that the time available to limit 
global warming is shrinking and serious emissions reductions are still awaited.
The literature on growth-versus-climate shows that theoretical and empirical 
support for both green growth and anti-growth is weak. Both strategies are risky 
and do not provide sufficient guarantee for managing climate change or other 
sustainability challenges. These strategies are also incompatible with a focus on 
social welfare in normative micro and macroeconomic theories. A third, neutral or 
indifferent vision called agrowth is more reasonable. It will create a broader basis 
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of support for stringent climate policies as it will de-polarize the growth debate 
by bridging the opposition between green growth and anti-growth positions. In 
contrast to pro-growth, the agrowth strategy does not give priority to income 
growth over the climate, but is aimed at finding a genuine balance between 
all aspects of social welfare. That is why it will provide more political scope for 
effective climate policy, as well as for a fair income distribution. In response to 
uncertainty about whether to be optimistic or pessimistic about sustainable 
growth, one can follow a precautionary strategy by being agnostic and being 
resilient to all possible options.
Since the unconditional pro-growth strategy is dogmatic in nature, change to 
a new agrowth paradigm will be difficult. Current politics is characterized by 
nervous reactions to low GDP growth. The preoccupation with GDP growth is 
invigorated by repetition, in both education and the media, of the erroneous idea 
that growth is necessary or even sufficient to solve important social problems. 
Higher economic growth has also been shown to increases the likelihood that 
government leaders will stay on longer (Burke, 2012). Hence, the pressure on 
politicians to be guided by unconditional economic growth is unfortunately still 
great. If change does occur, it is likely to come in stages, such as: first social 
sciences, then economics, then politics and then voters.
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